The Sinhala volitive/involitive contrast is characterized by verb stem and subject case marking alternations, and broadly indicates the volitionality/non-volitionality of the subject, plus other co-varying features. While superficially a high/low transitivity splità la Hopper and Thompson (1980) , we argue that the distinction actually emerges from the interaction of just two factors: a realis/irrealis mode contrast relating to expectations of certain event participants and an independent semantic case system (building on Inman 1993). Co-variation of other semantic features -including volitionality -follows directly from their interaction with semantic case and modality. Explaining this transitivity split through the interaction of language-specific elements, our analysis refines recent Optimality Theoretic approaches to transitivity (Malchukov 2005 (Malchukov , 2006 by partly obviating the need for 1 separate, transitivity-specific constraints and constraint rankings.
Introduction
Prototype theories of transitivity (Hopper and Thompson 1980 , Tsunoda 1981 , 1985 , Lazard 1998 , Malchukov 2005 , inter alia) maintain that transitivity is a gradient notion, wherein a clause may be more or less transitive based on the degree to which it conforms to a transitive prototype defined in terms of some set of distinct but co-varying semantic features. Much work in this area has looked at so-called transitivity splits, where two clauses that differ in one or more relevant semantic features also differ by some overt grammatical distinction. However, certain questions regarding the nature of the systematic co-variation remain unexplained in the literature: why should the semantic features that tend to vary across transitivity splits vary together, and why should they result in specific types of grammatical splits? Using evidence from Colloquial Sinhala verb classes, we address these questions, demonstrating that a careful spelling out of the semantics of the relevant semantic and grammatical transitivity features in particular languages can sharpen our predictions about co-variation.
Sinhala verbs fall into two stem classes, the volitive and involitive. Subjects of volitives are almost invariably nominative and subjects of involitives occur in nominative, accusative, dative, or the postpositional case atiN. Volitives generally indicate volitional action and involitives non-volitional action (Gair 1970 , Inman 1993 . Examples are given in (1), where a transitive volitive in (1a) contrasts with both a transitive involitive in (1b), where the subject is marked by atiN (glossed POST), and an inchoative involitive with 2 a nominative or accusative subject in (1c) (Beavers and Zubair 2009) . systematically co-vary with the case marking and stem alternations. However, we argue that a careful examination of volitive and involitive semantics reduces the contrast to just two cross-classifying properties of the language.
First, the stem alternation reflects a type of realis/irrealis contrast relating to the intentions or expectations of certain participants in the event (building on Inman 1993) . This interacts significantly with other features that reference intentions, including volitionality and ultimately actorhood, but not other features, predicting when we see co-variation. Second, case-marking patterns follow from an independently motivated set of semantic (i.e. inherent, non-structural) cases, with nominative (the default structural case) surfacing to cover gaps in the paradigm. The categorical use of the nominative in the volitive follows from the fact that all volitive stems have subjects that fall into these gaps due to the types of events that volitive verbs describe.
Our analysis has ramifications for prototype theories of transitivity. First, it addresses the nature of co-variation, showing that a careful spelling out of the semantics of the relevant transitivity features can predict which features will co-vary and which will not, sometimes in surprising ways. Second, transitivity splits may arise partly due to the specific morphosyntactic resources available in a language for marking transitivity features, rather than separate constraints on transitivity. However, this again requires a clear spelling out of the semantics of the various resources.
In §2 we review prototype theories of transitivity and unanswered questions that remain. In §3 we outline the basic morphosyntactic and semantic patterns of volitive and involitive stems suggesting a transitivity split. We look at these factors more deeply in §4 and argue that the volitive/involitive contrast is fundamentally a realis/irrealis contrast subsuming and thus predicting co-variation with volitionality, among others. In §5 we examine the distribution of the different subject cases in Sinhala, arguing that each case is predicted on independent semantic grounds. We conclude in §6.
Before we begin, we note that Spoken Sinhala consists of a diglossic linguistic system with two related but contrastively defined varieties referred to as Formal and Colloquial Sinhala (Paolillo 1997) . Colloquial and Formal Sinhala are lexically and grammatically distinct, and prescriptively used in different social domains. While our data draws primarily on Colloquial Sinhala, we note that subject case and the interpretation of involitive verbs is subject to regional variation. Thus we focus on the semantics underlying certain cases and interpretations when they arise for speakers, drawing from previously published and new data. Additional constraints may apply on an item by item or speaker by speaker basis.
2 High and Low Transitivity
The prototype theory of transitivity of Hopper and Thompson (1980) differentiates two types of transitive clauses. A prototypical, or "high" transitive, clause is one associated with a certain set of semantic features, while "low" transitive clauses are associated with essentially the opposite features (or the absence of them). These features are given in (2) First, the Transitivity Hypothesis lacks independent grammatical definitions of high and low transitivity through which to verify their claims. Tsunoda (1981, 1985) addresses this by tying high/low transitivity to morphological markedness. He asserts that unmarked NOM-ACC or ERG-ABS case frames reflect high transitivity, while alternative (more marked) case frames indicate low transitivity. This provides a testable link between the semantic factors in (2) and some grammatical consequence, yet does not clarify which marked case frames will occur for any given low transitivity feature. Malchukov's (2005 Malchukov's ( , 2006 Optimality Theoretic interpretation of transitivity partly addresses these issues. Malchukov (2006) ranked high yet still assimilate most verb types to the transitive default?
In the following, we update Malchukov's Transitivity Scale and OT analysis as pertains to the Sinhala volitive/involitive split, in a way that follows from independently documented semantic patterns of the relevant features.
The emergent definitions of each feature allows us to make specific predictions about when we will get systematic co-variation between features and when we will not. Furthermore, doing so we show that the semantic features do not form a one-dimensional hierarchy, but rather a multi-dimensional map. Likewise, the devices independently available for marking low transitivity have semantic content that also plays a role in predicting when we get high/low transitive marking, regardless of the underlying clausal semantics.
Volitive and Involitive Verbs -Syntax and Semantics
The Sinhala volitive/involitive stem contrast is marked by a combination of morphophonological features (Inman 1993: 23-27 
-a-n@wa ir-e-n@wa ir-u(w)-a ir-un-a 'make' had-a-n@wa haed-e-n@wa haed-u(w)-a haed-un-a 'open' ar-i-n@wa aer-e-n@wa aer-i(y)-a aer-un-a
Volitives take nominative subjects and indicate volitional action as in (8a) for an unergative verb and in (8b-e) for (di)transitive verbs. Direct objects may be accusative (8c) or dative (8d), although, since Sinhala is a differential object-marking language, only animates show accusative (8b,c), and then only optionally (8c). Indirect objects are dative as in (8e). (8) give.VOL.PST 'He gave me this week's money.' (Gair 1970: 64) Semantically, volitive verbs do not strictly entail volitionality. At least some volitives may occur in explicitly non-volitional contexts. In (9), the verb has a volitive stem and a nominative subject, but can occur with the modifier hit@la nemeyi 'without intention', indicating accidental action. without 'The child broke the plate unintentionally.' (Inman 1993: 98, (39)) Nonetheless, some volitives require volitionality, including the verb for 'murder', which is incompatible with a continuation denying volitionality:
without 'Siri murdered Gunee, but not intentionally.'
Therefore while some volitives entail volitionality, others leave it unspecified. We thus assume volitionality can be a property of the verb root, but for roots that do not entail volitionality, we assume it arises by Gricean implicature (in contrast with the involitive stem), which we discuss further below.
Turning to involitives verbs, as noted in §1 subjects of involitives are found in a range of different cases. Subjects of transitive verbs are marked by the postposition atiN or by dative case as in (11a,b) respectively. Subjects of intransitives may be dative, accusative, or even nominative, as in (11c-e) respectively. In addition, the unaccusatives in (11d,e) represent detransitivized versions of (8c). Crucially, unlike volitive stems, most involitives categorically entail non-volitionality, as also shown in (11). and (E) conflict. We argue next that a careful spelling out of the semantics of the relevant features predicts co-variation, with the addition of another feature.
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The Irrealis Nature of Involitive Stems in Sinhala
As depicted in previous analyses (Inman 1993 , Henadeerage 2002 , the semantics of the involitive are complex beyond a simple correlation with non-volitionality. Inman (1993) analyzes volitionality intensionally, building on Kratzer (1977 Kratzer ( , 1981 . Kratzer proposes that intensional modal operators consist of at least two core components: (1) the modal force, representing either necessity or possibility of a proposition being true in some world(s) and (2) the modal base, representing the relevant conversational background against which the modal force is interpreted. Inman analyzes the intentions/expectations of individual x as a set of possible worlds, such that if x intends for P to be true, then x's intentions are a subset of the worlds at which P is true. Thus if there exists any world in the intention set such that P is false, P was not intended, yielding the following definition of unexpectedness/unintendedness (drawing from Inman 1993: 120, though we also allow for cases where x has no intentions):
(12) P is unintended by/unexpected to x iff there is some possible world in which x's intentions/expectations are realized in which P is false, or x has no intentions.
We follow Inman in analyzing the involitives in (11) as reflecting a modal operator over the proposition P expressed by the predicate indicating unintendedness of P by the subject x. The modal base is x's intentions and the force is possibility (there is some world in the base at which P is false):
(13) Involitive (version 1): inv P is true iff P is true and P is unexpected to the subject x.
(cf. Inman 1993: 138, (107))
Our updated definition in (12) covers not just cases where the subject did not intend to make P true, but also cases where the subject had no intentions at all, thus permitting inanimate subjects with unaccusatives as in (14). (14 
cook.INV.PRS 'The girl can cook fish very well.' (despite expectations)
Here the reading is that the girl cooked well on purpose, but this was unexpected to the speaker, a reading Inman refers to as "doxastic". To capture this, Inman (1993: 140-152) suggests that the modal base of the involitive can in some cases be the expectations of the speaker, all else being equal:
(16) Involitive (version 2): inv P is true iff P is true and P is unexpected to speaker y or subject x.
Thus the involitive seems to have as its semantics (a) that the event occurred and (b) that it was unexpected from the viewpoint of either the subject or the speaker, where the modal force is that of possibility (there exists at least some world in the modal base at which the event did not occur).
Unfortunately, our informants were unable to verify Inman's doxastic examples. However, we did find an additional ironic use of the involitive that occurs during "smack talk" (playful taunting and insulting First, contra Inman, the propositions are not asserted to be true -rather, their truth is denied. Second, the modal force is necessity, since it is not just that the speaker did not expect for the proposition to be true, but rather the speaker expects it to be false, i.e. in all worlds in the modal base.
Thus factoring out the semantics common to all involitives, we first see that assertion of P is not part of its semantics; it obtains only on some uses.
Second, the strongest modal force across all uses is possibility; necessity the ironic use is a stronger reading, leaving the core semantics in (20).
(20) Involitive (final): inv P is true iff P is unexpected to the speaker y or subject x.
In the ironic use the modal force is strengthened to "entirely unexpected"
and the modal base is the speaker's intentions. In the non-volitional and doxastic readings P is additionally asserted to be true, though the two readings differ in the modal base (subject's intentions vs. speaker intentions respectively). Thus Inman's modal analysis (with some modifications) provides a simple way to capture the range of uses of the involitive, by differences in modal base, modal force, and truth of the proposition.
Nonetheless, Inman does not give a corresponding definition of the volitive, which we provide in (21b), based on the definition of intendedness in (21a), where P must be true and (by default) must be intended by the subject (the modal base is the subject's intention and the modal force is necessity):
(21) a. P is intended by x iff for all possible worlds in which x's intentions/expectations are realized x made P is true.
b. Volitive: vol P is true iff P is true and (by default) P was intended by the subject x.
Note that (21a) is not the negation of (12). First, intendedness (unlike unintendedness) requires not just that x expects P to be true, but expects to make P true (e.g. if one expects to be forced to do something then one expects to do it but does not intend to do it). Second, vacuous universal quantification over an empty intention set allows inanimates, which lack intentions, to occur with volitives, a prediction borne out for natural forces and instruments: However, the fact that this specific modal operator references subject intentions most often means that it typically boils down to a volitional/nonvolitional contrast, even if it fundamentally is not one. In other words, (E) in (2) is reducible to a particular subtype of (G), and because of this additional property of this particular modal operator, the effect is one of systematic co-variation of (E) and (G). Likewise, recall that subjects of volitives must be actors (H), another co-varying feature. Why should this be? Here we tentatively suggest that it has to do with the pragmatic principle in (23):
for someone to act volitionally is for her to intend to make an event occur, and thus she must be capable of bringing it about, i.e. an actor. Thus action by the subject is a prerequisite for (23). Conversely, for involitives no such constraint applies, and both actor and non-actors are possible.
Thus co-variation between mode, volitionality, and actorhood is expected semantically. Conversely, co-variation with other features is not expected.
For example, number of participants is not inherently a mode distinction, and thus we predict (and see) no correlation. This analysis makes predictions that differ from Malchukov's Transitivity Scale in §2. Malchukov puts mode ("factivity"), adjacent to tense/aspect but separated from volitionality. Yet our discussion has shown that volitionality can be effectively reduced to a subtype of the mode once the semantics of volitionality are better spelled out. This means that mode can be both an A-related and V-related feature, depending on the specific modal operator (indeed also supporting the Relevance Principle, since the feature is marked on both elements via stem form and quirky case). But of course it need not be; other modal operators may make no reference to A or O participants.
Likewise, the mode to actorhood connection (mediated through volitionality) is also unexpected in general, but predicted in this particular case.
More fundamentally, our analysis demonstrates that the relationships between features are not one-dimensional, but multi-dimensional, contingent 20 on the specific meanings of the specific features in a given language.
Ideally, once the semantics of each feature is spelled out, there should be no need for a Transitivity Scale to predict co-variation -all of the predictions follow from the semantics, recognizing a more fluid set of interactions.
Our analysis has shown that this is possible for three features relevant for the involitive. With this analysis of the volitive/involitive stem contrast as a backdrop, we turn next to the case variation we see in involitives. 
Subject Case and Verb Type
Recall that Malchukov (2005) proposes that verb type (as determinant of thematic roles for A and O) interacts with argument realization constraints to produce different case patterns in different languages. However, the Sinhala data above pose an interesting puzzle for this proposal: volitive verbs, regardless of verb type, are always coded as high transitives. Why should this be? One might suggest that realis mood -the only core feature for volitives -is necessary for effective action. But why would this manifest as an unmarked case frame except through the A-related feature of volitionality, which does not hold categorically? 4 Alternatively, it could be that the constraints are ranked differently for volitives and involitives, so that TransDef (preferring unmarked case frames) is ranked more highly for volitives than involitives. But why should this be?
We argue that the high transitive case frames of volitives are expected once we make a careful examination of the semantics of the relevant cases.
In particular, the quirky cases found with involitives all have independently motivated meanings that are all ruled out for volitives, leaving the default case, nominative, as the only possible subject case. Indeed, even among involitives there are gaps in the semantic case paradigm, predicting the presence of nominative -and thus high transitive marking -there as well.
Dative vs. atiN Subjects
Subjects marked by atiN occur exclusively with transitive caused change- Inman argues that in (27a) the subject acted intentionally, perhaps to eat something, but ended up eating sand, while in (27b) the subject did not intend to do anything at all, yet found himself eating sand. We return to this below, but the fact that the verbs in (25) do not allow an alternation while (27) does suggests that there is a semantic restriction on atiN as well.
We argue that atiN marks involuntary causers while dative marks a host of thematic roles sharing non-volitionality in common. First, dative generally marks experiencer subjects (as in many Indo-Aryan languages; see the papers in Verma and Mohanan 1990). For example, experiencer subjects of non-verbal predicates can also be dative:
sick-ASN 'Our child is a bit sick.' (Gair and Paolillo 1988) Thus the dative in (25b) can be assimilated under a more general use of the dative for experiencer subjects. Dative also independently marks possessors, including both possessor subjects and indirect objects (the stative volitive in (29a) being a very rare example of a non-volitional, quirky subject volitive, which we treat as a lexical exception):
exists.VOL.PRS
'The child has a toy.' (Gair and Paolillo 1997: 66) give.VOL.PST 'He gave me this week's money.' (Gair 1970: 64) Thus the dative in (25c) can also be subsumed under a more general use of the dative. Indeed, these two datives may be collapsible, as argued by Mohanan and Mohanan (1990) However, this analysis does not obviously explain why dative also marks subjects of unergatives or subjects of performance verbs such as those meaning 'read', 'perform', and 'recite'. Before we offer a tentative solution to this, we first argue that these two uses of the dative are not distinct. As suggested by Tenny (1994) , and then argued (in different ways) by Beavers (2009) and Rappaport Hovav (2008) , performance verbs are not standard agent/patient transitive verbs on par with verbs meaning 'break' or 'cool'.
Rather, these verbs take direct objects that measure out the event by the subject's progress through the object -the subject "moves" through the book in (25a), much in the same way that the subject moves along the path object in John hiked the trail. Evidence for this comes from the fact that performance objects pattern like path objects in terms of measure phrases: in both cases V DO halfway means roughly V half of DO, an equivalence that does not maintain for most change-of-state verbs:
(30) a. John hiked half of the trail ↔ John hiked the trail halfway.
b. John read half of a book ↔ John read a book halfway.
c. John cooled half of the soup John cooled the soup halfway.
In (30c) the first clause is true if half of the soup becomes any cooler, while the second clause is true only if there is a contextually specified target temperature for the soup to which John has cooled it halfway. No separate contexts are possible for the pairs in (30a,b) . Furthermore, the subjects in (30a,b) are in a sense "in motion", albeit abstractly in (30b), but not for (30c). This can be seen in (31), where for (31a,b) the subject is entailed to be "in the middle" of the object, but not so for patient objects in (31c).
(31) a. John is hiking the trail, so he is somewhere in the middle of it.
b. John is reading a book, so he is somewhere in the middle of it.
c. #John is cooling the soup, so he is somewhere in the middle of it. This is again explained if performance verbs are analyzed as abstract motion verbs, where the subject progresses through the direct object, which in turn measures out the event (see Beavers 2009 for a detailed analysis). On this analysis, performance verbs are abstract unergative verbs, and thus the dative is subsumable under the same analysis as more canonical unergatives.
With this reduction, we argue that the subject role for involitive unergatives is that of involuntary actor. Evidence comes from a comparison with the semantics of atiN, which we suggest marks involuntary causers. It is a crucial difference between clauses that take atiN and those that take dative that the former have causative semantics, i.e. in standard event decompositional terms we can say that causative events have the structure in (32a) and unergatives have the structure in (32b) (following the notation of Rappaport
Hovav and Levin 1998: 108 for expository convenience).
Causation can be probed for by scope ambiguities with modifiers such as negation (Dowty 1979: Ch.5 ). Negated causative clauses are ambiguous between a reading where the causing event did not occur, the resultant event did not occur, or neither occurred, as in (33a). This is not possible with non-causative verbs as in (33b), there being only one subevent in (32b). Further evidence for the contrast between clauses with atiN subjects and those with dative subjects comes from verbs that show an alternation. As noted above, the verb meaning 'eat' in (27) allows either atiN or dative; with the former the subject intended to do something, though not to eat sand, while in the latter case the subject had no intentions at all. Crucially, with eat verbs the subject is both an actor and a causer: the subject works his way through the sand in (27) like a motion verb (Ramchand 2008 ) and simultaneously the sand comes to be affected (eaten) by the action of the subject like an agent/patient verb (Beavers 2009 ). This event type is schematized in (35) (again borrowing for convenience the notation for accomplishments with associated actions of Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998: 108) .
If dative marks involuntary actors and atiN marks involuntary causers, the dual nature of the subject's role explains the alternation and the semantic contrast. If the action is intentional but the causation is not, the subject is an involuntary causer, yielding atiN. Alternatively, if the action itself is unintended, the subject is an involuntary actor and dative is licensed. Thus the semantic contrast reflects the variable scope of the involitive operator, providing further motivation for the contrast in the two cases.
We now ask what independent evidence there is for these analyses. For datives, we tentatively suggest that an involuntary actor is essentially an experiencer, albeit an experiencer of a physical sensation of performing an action rather than a psychological or static physical sensation. The explanation for the lack of dative inanimate involuntary actors may follow from this fact (since inanimates cannot be experiencers), or from a restriction of dative to actors that are truly non-volitional, requiring that they have inten-tions (i.e. unlike the involitive operator more generally, inanimates are not exempt from computing intentions if dative).
For atiN we propose that its distribution derives from its etymology: it is synchronically identical to the instrumental form of at@ 'hand', i.e. it is superficially identical to the expression 'by hand'. However, there is evidence that it has grammaticalized into a substantive postposition (Gair 1970: 73) that heads a PP that is the subject of the involitive clause. First, the [ DP atiN ] phrase is a constituent, as can be shown by constituency tests.
For example, while scrambling is possible in Sinhala, as shown in (36a-c),
atiN cannot be scrambled away from the DP it marks, as shown in (36d,e). Thus atiN forms a constituent with the DP to its left, and is not (for example) an instrumental adverbial. However, the resultant constituent shares an index with the embedded DP, not the postposition. As Inman (1993: 53-56) makes clear, these PPs can act as antecedents for various types of anaphors, including the null subject PRO of adverbial clauses as in (37a) and reflexive pronouns as in (37b) (Inman 1993: 54-56, (52) , (57)). These data confirm that atiN phrases are not literally translated as '(by) X's hand', since otherwise the referent of the phrase would be X's hand, not X, and these binding facts would be surprising. Thus atiN is historically an instrumental, but synchronically a case-marking postposition.
However, we suggest that two (vestigial) aspects of atiN's erstwhile instrumental semantics explain its use marking involuntary causes in transitive clauses. First, we consider the semantics of instrumentality vis-à-vis causation. Croft (1991:178) analyzes the English instrumental with as a marker of causal intermediacy, i.e. an entity intermediate in the event's force-dynamic structure, being acted upon by an external causer but causally prior to some patient. This general semantics subsumes the two different uses of with marking canonical instruments as in (38a) and so-called "displaced themes" (Rappaport and Levin 1988: 28-31) as in (38b), with the common forcedynamic semantics illustrated in the (simplified) Croft-style diagrams. Likewise, the exclusive use of atiN in involitive clauses may also derive from its erstwhile instrumental status. Instruments are by definition unwitting, so that we might expect atiN to only occur in non-volitional clauses.
However, as noted above, doxastic and ironic uses with atiN are volitional, suggesting that non-volitionality is not a synchronic component of its meaning. Nonetheless, it is plausible that this component of instrumentality has grammaticalized into a restriction that atiN only occur with involitives. Thus, while postpositional atiN is not attested outside of involitive clauses, its distribution may have an independent diachronic semantic explanation.
We can thus sweep non-nominative subjects of transitive and unergative verbs under two semantic cases:
(40) a. Dative = "goal" (goal, recipient, experiencer, involuntary actor) b. atiN = causally prior participant (for involitives)
We turn next to intransitives, and argue that semantics also determines the subject cases there, although at least one case may indeed be a default case.
Nominative vs. Accusative Subjects
Unaccusative verbs occur exclusively in the involitive. There are at least two types of unaccusatives: externally caused change-of-state (ECOS) (e.g.
maerenn@ 'die'; waet . enn@ 'fall'; gilenn@ 'drown'; hir@wenn@ 'get stuck'; lissenn@ 'slip') and internally caused change-of-state (ICOS) (pipenn@ 'bloom') (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 90ff.) . The fact that nominative subjects occur with involitive verbs is surprising -Inman claims that nominative never occurs with involitive verbs, though
Henadeerage gives numerous examples and our informants also find them acceptable. Beavers and Zubair (2009) Thus the only explanation is that nominative fills in the gaps where other cases fail, and there are more such gaps with volitive verbs than involitives.
The Interaction of Verb Type, Semantic Case, and Volitivity
To summarize, we have argued for particular semantic definitions for dative, atiN, and accusative that predict their distributions. Nominative is not associated with any semantics, and shows up when no more specific case applies, including nearly all volitive verbs and even some involitives. The patterns in §3 and § §5.1-5.2 emerge through the interaction of three factors: verb class, the modal operators associated with the two stem types, and the system of specific semantic cases found in the language. In terms of Malchukov (2005), FaithRole (overtly indicate thematic roles) is presumably ranked highly in Sinhala, explaining why we get quirky cases at all. However, were we to focus just on Malchukov's constraints, we might expect some volitives with quirky subjects, and likewise no nominative subjects in involitives. We could overcome this by saying TransDef (prefer unmarked frames) is ranked more highly just for volitive stems, but this would not explain nominative subjects with involitives. On our analysis, no reranking is necessary: even with FaithRole ranked highly across the board, if there is no case for a given thematic role, then nominative is all that is left (i.e. FaithRole is vacuously satisfied). However, it is only by examining the semantics of particular cases in detail that this conclusion emerges, adding an additional level of explanation beyond Malchukov's broader constraints on surface forms.
Conclusion
We have argued that the Sinhala volitive/involitive contrast is a high/low transitivity split that reduces to two factors: a stem alternation indicating a realis/irrealis distinction that has significant interaction with volitionality and actorhood, and a system of semantic cases. In contrast to Malchukov's one-dimensional Transitivity Scale, our analysis indicates that semantic features form a multi-dimensional map. The crucial factor is the way particular semantic features are independently defined, so that mode -not normally considered an A-related feature -happens to be an A-related feature here.
Likewise, the resources available in a language for marking low transitivity are semantically contentful but may contain gaps that result in the emer- back. We would also like to thank our informants. Any errors or omissions are our own.
2 There are of course other modalities in Sinhala (e.g. future tense) that vary independently; we refer here just to the specific modality associated with (in)volitive-marking.
3 Alternatively, volitive-marking could be a type of evidential-marking, which is independently known to express non-volitionality (Curnow 2003) . However, while evidentials and involitivites clearly overlap in functionality, as Curnow (p.40) notes, the key feature of evidentiality is reference to the source of the information conveyed by the proposition, something not encoded by volitivity-marking. Thus volitive-marking is not a type of evidential-marking, though there is clearly a semantic link; we leave this for future work. 4 There is some evidence of this in other languages as well. Brandt (2006) notes a parallel situation with German cipient-datives in too-comparatives similar to The soup is too hot (to me). Brandt argues that the predicate expressing too hotness generates a presupposition that there is some other index (world) in which this state of affairs does not obtain, and this index is associated with the dative-marked participant, which he analyzes as a predicate internal subject of sorts. Thus again computing possible worlds results in A-marking. 5 The difference between (26) and the volitive variant in (22a) is that the involitive typically conveys a meaning that the blowing is unexpected/unexplained to the speaker, i.e. a doxastic use. To simply say that the wind blows, the volitive is the preferred form. This is as expected on our approach. Since the subject has an empty intention set, the non-volitional reading of the involitive means the same as the volitive. In this case we would expect the unmarked volitive to be preferred, leaving the involitive for uses that do not code subject intentions, such as the doxastic. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out us.
